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Abstract
This chapter discusses the impacts of globalization on international trade patterns and
the required shifts in trade policies. Highlighting the effects of production fragmenta‐
tion,  geographic  dispersion and the  expansion of  global  value  chains  (GVCs),  the
chapter  outlines  the  Brazilian  experience  to  illustrate  the  difficulties  that  various
countries face in acknowledging this economic reality and providing appropriate policy
responses. It draws on the global value chains literature to analyze Brazil’s foreign trade
policies implemented during the recent ruling of the Labor Party (PT) presidents Lula
da Silva and Dilma Rousseff (2003 to 2015), discussing the Brazilian strategy (or the lack
of one) to integrate into global value chains. Results of this exercise have led to the
conclusion that a non–GVC‐oriented trade policy has allowed Brazil to integrate only
superficially  into  globalized  international  production  and  commercial  flows.  The
chapter concludes providing an outlook on the policy shifts required for increasing
Brazil’s  insertion  into  global  value  chains  and boosting  a  more  prominent  role  in
international trade.
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1. Introduction
The beginning of the twenty‐first century has witnessed many shifts in international trade
patterns and its  composition,  resulting from the evolution in the economic globalization
process. Under the logic of transnational companies, the objectives of cross‐border trading
have become wider and more complex. Production fragmentation in tasks and its geographic
dispersion in global value chains (GVCs) have fostered a multilayered relational framework
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linking international trade, support services to the companies’ core activities and foreign direct
investment.
This rapidly evolving scenario has generated important implications for trade policy. It has
different meanings depending on each country’s domestic context. Developed nations, for
instance, are concerned about retaining jobs and keeping the upper‐level activities in the value
chain. Some developing economies, on the other hand, are proactively making efforts to engage
in global value chains, while for other countries the main concerns are linked to upgrading in
value chains.
Policy responses to these challenges have been different around the globe. A number of
countries have effectively implemented trade policies informed by the GVC’s framework,
focusing on promoting export competitiveness, attracting investments and supporting the
internationalization of their businesses. On the other hand, the debate over GVCs and the new
trade patterns is still in early stages in some nations, which have failed to recognize the deep
changes in the international trade structure. Currently, a protectionist movement has also
gained momentum, opposing globalization and geared towards slowing the pace of interna‐
tional economic integration.
In light of this context, this chapter is aimed at discussing the Brazilian strategy (or the lack of
one) to integrate into global value chains and reap the benefits of a stronger participation in
international trade. It focuses on the Brazilian experience, centering its analysis on the foreign
trade policy responses this important emerging economy has implemented in the last 13 years
of the Labor Party’s (PT) government (2003–2015). The chapter draws on the GVC’s literature
to provide a comprehensive landscape of Brazil’s foreign trade policies, analyzing primary
trade data (traditional and value added) and building a qualitative discussion of government
development plans, trade and investment regulations and policies.
The chapter comprises three sections. The first section discusses the “twenty‐first‐century
trade” features. The second section outlines the current level of Brazilian participation in global
value chains (GVCs). The third section presents the concept of a “GVCs‐oriented trade policy,”
encompassing four variables, which are tested against Brazil’s empirical experience. The
conclusion brings an outlook on the political shifts required for increasing Brazil’s insertion
into global value chains and boosting a more prominent role in international trade.
2. International trade in the twenty-first century
International trade has undergone profound shifts, playing a central role in the production
process of companies now organized in global value chains (GVCs). In a deeply connected
world, where companies rely on cross‐border flows for “making goods” instead of just “selling
goods” [1], international trade is no longer limited to the traditional sale of a final good “made
in” a country to consumers in another region. The development of global value chains evolved
in parallel to economic globalization and both processes have had common catalysts: new
information and communication technologies, reduction in transportation costs and trade and
investment liberalization.
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International trade in goods has increased from approximately US$ 10 trillion in 2004 to US
$ 18.5 trillion in 2014, while world trade in services has risen from US$ 2 trillion to nearly US
$ 5 trillion in the same period [2]. The increase in international trade in intermediate inputs
and components, which accounted for almost US$ 8 trillion in 2014, illustrates the production
fragmentation, its geographic dispersion and the complexity of current production systems,
with multilayered international sourcing networks.
The concept of global value chains has been used to characterize the set of activities that
companies and workers perform in the process of developing a product, from its conception
to end use, and also including after‐sale services [3]. Under this concept, the usual stages in a
production chain are included: inputs; research and development; manufacture; distribution;
marketing; and after‐sales services. These activities have increasingly become fragmented and
geographically dispersed around the globe. The functional integration of these tangible and
intangible value‐adding activities or tasks and its governance is a key feature of this concept,
differentiating trade within global value chains from traditional arm’s‐length trade [4].
Linked to the evolution of global value chains, the concept of “trade in tasks” emerged to
illustrate that each stage of value adding to a good, throughout its production chain process,
can be seen as a task with potential to be internationally transacted inter‐ or intracompanies
[5]. The cross‐border trade of tasks is aimed at minimizing production and transaction costs
and achieving gains in competitiveness. Following this private sector logic, countries may now
specialize in certain tasks rather than in productive sectors or complete value chains.
This increasing fragmentation of production stages and its dispersion around the globe has
highlighted the complexity of the nexus among trade, investments, services and intellectual
property [6]. The concept of “twenty‐first‐century international trade” reflects these multiples
linkages in the transactions within global value chains. In order to understand the current trade
patterns, it is required a joint analysis of these intertwined factors: (i) trade in goods, mainly
parts and components; (ii) international investments in production plants, training, technology
and long‐term business relationships; (iii) the use of infrastructure services (telecommunica‐
tions, internet, parcel delivery, air transport, etc.) to coordinate the production; and (iv)
international flows of knowledge, intellectual property and tacit exchanges of know‐how. The
concept of “twenty‐first‐century trade” reflects, in sum, the implications of trade globalization
and its deep linkages with finance and productive globalization.
The international trade landscape has also changed due to the increased South‐South trade
and the proliferation of preferential trade agreements. Between 1948 and 1994, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) received 124 notifications of regional trade agreements
(covering trade in goods). Since the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in
1995, the number of agreements in force increased to 267 [7]. Currently, all WTO members have
at least one regional trade agreement in force. Multilateral trade agreements, however, have
not advanced in the same pace. The WTO Doha Round, launched in 2001, has not been
concluded and members have signed only a trade facilitation agreement.
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3. Brazil’s insertion in global value chains and world trade
During the 2000s, Brazil raised in the international scene as a promising emerging economy,
showcasing a widely praised “growth‐with‐social‐inclusion” model that leveraged the country
to the seventh position in the global GDP rank. Brazil’s emergence, however, has been much
more linked to the triad “credit, domestic consumption and commodities” rather than the
development of a world‐class industry, leading global value chains and capable of placing
Brazil ahead of the international competition.
In 2014, Brazil accounted for only 1.2% of the global exports of goods, ranking 25th in the top
exporters rank. Brazil exported US$ 225 billion, and imported US$ 239 billion [8]. Brazil’s
participation in global services trade is also small. In 2014, Brazil exported US$ 40 billion in
commercial services, while imported US$ 87 billion. Low linkages to global value chains, as
well as decreasing industrial labor productivity, poor innovation rates and an obsolete
industrial park have hampered the growth of Brazil’s participation in world trade.
Among the top 25 exporters, Brazil ranks 24th in terms of participation in GVCs, with a 37%
rate of integration [9]. Brazil’s integration level, Brazil’s integration level is slightly higher than
India’s (36%), but lower than China’s (59%), Russia (56%) and South Africa (59%). The ratio of
domestic value‐added content in Brazilian gross exports is significantly high, exceeding 90%,
the second highest among G20 countries [10]. This figure reflects Brazil’s role as supplier of
raw materials and primary inputs for GVCs. This high level of domestic value added would
be positive if reflecting industrial production. However, in the Brazilian case, it is mainly the
result of high share of primary goods and commodities in exports. In 2015, for instance, the
agribusiness sector accounted for more than 46% of Brazil’s total exports [11].
OECD‐WTO Trade in Value Added (TiVA) database’s figures released in 2015, which measured
trade in valued added for year 2011, have confirmed Brazil’s low engagement in GVCs. In 2011,
ICT and electronics industry had the highest foreign value added share in Brazil’s exports,
accounting for 24.1%, followed by coke and petroleum (21.4%) and motor vehicles (19.9%).
OECD‐WTO TiVA analysis have also highlighted the underdevelopment of a regional value
chain in Latin America, contrasting with the linkages found in North America, Europe and
East Asia. Brazil’s major import and export markets are from outside the region. In 2011, China
directly imported one‐quarter of all Brazil’s intermediate exports in value‐added terms [12].
Brazil’s low participation in international trade reflects the inward orientation of its develop‐
ment strategy implemented along the 13 years (2003–2015) that the PT (Labour Party) governed
Brazil. During this period, three versions of industrial policies have been launched, using
traditional “picking winners” strategies, strong local content requirements and the goal of
developing and maintaining full production chains within the country.
In 2003, early in the first term of former President Lula da Silva, the government launched the
Industrial, Technological and Foreign Trade Policy (PITCE), aimed at promoting gains in
competitiveness through technological innovation [13]. PITCE focused on technology
intensive sectors, such as capital goods, semiconductors, biotechnology and software. The
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government considered these sectors as key to develop Brazil’s innovation system and to
transfer productivity gains to the rest of the industry.
Five years later, the government revamped this policy, launching in 2008 the Productive
Development Policy (PDP). This policy provided a detailed roadmap for actions in 25 sectors,
aimed at upgrading the industrial pattern of investments. Due to the international economic
crisis in 2008 and 2009, however, this policy became a set of anti‐cyclical measures rather than
initiatives capable of structurally transforming the industrial sector.
The “Greater Brazil Plan” (Plano Brasil Maior), launched in 2011 in the first term of President
Dilma Rousseff, was the last broad industrial policy implemented in Brazil, focusing on
promoting technologic and production competencies to strengthen domestic value chains [14].
One of the core guidelines of the plan was to promote a “structural change in Brazil’s insertion
into the international economy.” It was aimed at diversifying and boosting exports, seeking to
increase Brazil’s share in international trade from 1.36% in 2010 to 1.60% in 2014. Trade‐related
policies focused on the following objectives: (a) promoting exports of intermediate‐technology
and knowledge‐intensive products, (b) supporting the internationalization of companies
through product differentiation and greater domestic value added, and (c) rooting foreign
companies in Brazil and attracting research and development (R & D) centers.
Although these industrial policies suggested a roadmap for fostering national competitiveness,
they still did not reflect a full understanding of the structural changes in the global production
system, increasingly internationally dispersed and fragmented in GVCs. The empirical results
of PITCE, PDP and Greater Brazil Plan have been criticized because international trade and
industrial activity indicators for the period point to a specialization in low‐technology goods
and commodities.
In spite of the governmental efforts to foster innovation and increase technological content in
exports, Brazil consolidated a position of commodities exporter. The share of non‐manufac‐
tured exports increased from 19.9% in 2003 to 37.7% in 2015. Furthermore, the share of exports
of high‐technology products decreased from 7% in 2003 to 5.2% in 2015, and the share of
medium‐high technology exports decreased from 22.8 to 16 % in the same period. On the other
hand, the profile of imports remained relatively stable, with medium‐high technology
products accounting for 42.7% of the total Brazilian imports in 2015. Likewise, the analysis of
the technological intensity of Brazil’s trade balance shows an increased trade deficit in high
and medium‐high technology goods. In 2015, Brazil had a US $ 22.8 billion trade deficit in
high‐technology products and a US $ 42.7 billion deficit in medium‐high technology products
[15].
During the first mandate of the Dilma Rousseff administration (2011–2014), furthermore,
Brazilian foreign trade flows of goods showed a decrease, from US $ 482.3 billion in 2011 to
US $ 454.1 in 2014. Commercial services’ trade had just a slight increase. In 2011, Brazil exported
US $ 37.11 billion, while imported US $ 73.1 billion. In 2014, Brazil exported US $ 39 billion
and imported US $ 85.9 billion [16].
Rousseff’s economic policy departed from the three pillars maintained in the previous
government (primary surplus, floating exchange rate and inflation targets), and Brazil’s
Brazil in the Twenty-First-Century International Trade: Challenges and Opportunities
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/66259
67
economic fundamentals started to deteriorate. Brazilian trade followed the downward trend.
Exports declined from a 2011 peak of US $ 256 billion to US $ 191.1 billion in 2015. In 2015 (the
first year of Rouseff’s second term), trade flows continued to drop, decreasing to US $ 362.5
billion, while Brazil’s GDP contracted 3.8% and trade accounted for only 27% of the GDP [17].
Combined with a large corruption scandal, the economic recession led to Rouseff’s impeach‐
ment in 2016.
4. GVC-prone foreign trade policies: Brazil’s profile
GVC‐oriented trade policies can positively influence the integration of domestic enterprises
into the world economy, as well as attracting and retaining high value‐added activities into the
country. In a world of global value chains, an integration prone foreign trade policy includes
four variables [18]: (i) adoption of an updated concept of international trade, recognizing the
nexus among trade of final goods, intermediates, services, investment and intellectual property
flows; (ii) focus on facilitating market access to inputs and intermediary goods into the
domestic market and seeks preferential access for exports into key foreign markets; (iii)
recognizes heterodox trade barriers, such as infrastructure, support services, business envi‐
ronment, among others; and (iv) foreign trade promotion targets the integration of small and
medium enterprises into global value chains.
Since the early 2000s, however, Brazil has not followed this GVC‐oriented model. Instead, the
Brazilian foreign trade policy has been crafted under the umbrella of larger industrial devel‐
opment plans, explained in the previous section. The government has favored the development
of full production chains within the country instead of specializing and integrating into global
value chains.
Looking at the first recommendation of the model, “adoption of an updated definition of
international trade,” Brazilian policies have only partially recognized the trade‐investment‐
intellectual property nexus. Although the policies have taken into account the connection
between trade and investments, it is not clear the recognition of the importance of imports of
world‐class inputs and parts for improving exports competitiveness. Brazil’s understanding
of the integrated trade concept, furthermore, seems to be limited, not including components
connected to intellectual property, information and innovation flows among countries. In the
diplomatic practice, an example of this disconnection can be observed in the science, technol‐
ogy and innovation agreements, since these partnerships are not perceived as potential
elements for foreign trade policy.
During the Lula da Silva two terms (2003–2010), the President himself engaged in commercial
diplomacy initiatives, strongly promoting the establishment of a “new international trade
geography,” pursuing a diversification of Brazilian commercial partnerships, focusing on a
larger relationship with countries of the South. Brazil also prioritized relations with MERCO‐
SUR, seeking to deepen the regional integration and the creation of a space for expanded
cooperation in South America.
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It is important to note that in that period, however, the search for new business partnerships
was not linked to a viewpoint of improving the integration of domestic firms into global
production chains. The mainstream perception regarding the international trade structure
was still related to the traditional North‐South cleavage, and the rapprochement to develop‐
ing countries was a general orientation of the Brazilian foreign policy in the period. Brazil’s
search for a more prominent role in foreign trade faded in Dilma Rousseff’s term, in face of
other government priorities and the low prestige granted to foreign policy issues in the
period.
Taking into account the “market access” aspect of a GVC‐oriented trade policy, Brazil’s
approach has favored protection, instead of liberalization. Governmental actions in this
direction have included tariff increases, nontariff barriers and strengthening of trade remedy
mechanisms. Furthermore, Brazil continues to have a high level of tariff protection through
MERCOSUR’s Common External Tariff, which averages 14.1% applied rate for non‐agricul‐
tural goods and 10.2% for agricultural goods [19].
Brazilian trade policy has emphasized the implementation of trade remedy measures,
beginning with the introduction of a “New Strategy of the Brazilian Trade Remedies System,”
in 2003. More recently, the government has increased the number of personnel dedicated to
this issue at the Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade. Brazil applied 112
definitive trade remedy measures from 2003 to 2010 and 152 measures from 2011 to 2015. These
numbers have significantly increased compared to the eight years before the Lula da Silva
government, when 66 definitive measures had been applied, including antidumping and
safeguards [20].
During the 2003–2010 period, Brazil engaged in large market access initiatives that could not
be concluded. At the beginning of the first term of President Lula, two parallel negotiations
were at the top of the government agenda: the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and
the MERCOSUR‐European Union (EU) negotiations. Such agreements would be instrumental
in increasing Brazil’s insertion in global value chains, taking into account that the United States
and the European Union are dynamic centers in various industries that could leverage Brazil’s
participation in global and regional production networks.
Negotiations of the FTAA, however, were suspended in 2005, due to irreconcilable differences
between Brazil’s and the USA’s negotiating approach and also regarding the scope of the
agreement. Brazilian interests to maintain “policy space” to implement its industrial policies
prevailed against offensive interests of part of the industry and the agribusiness sector. In
parallel, the MERCOSUR‐European Union negotiation, which in a way had been driven by
the prospect of competition that would be generated by the conclusion of the FTAA, lost
momentum in the following years. Negotiations resumed in 2010 and had relatively small
progress to date.
In spite of these two large regional free trade initiatives, Brazil’s top priority continued to be
the Doha Development Round of multilateral trade negotiations. The Brazilian government
believed this to be the ideal forum to address key trade issues, such as greater market access
for agricultural products in developed countries and subsidies reduction. Taking into
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account the deadlock in the Round, there was little progress in terms of greater market access
for Brazilian companies from 2003 to 2015. Brazil/MERCOSUR concluded extra‐regional free
trade agreements only with Israel (2007), Egypt (2010) and Palestine (2011). The FTA with
Israel is the only one currently in force, the others still need to be ratified. MERCOSUR also
signed limited preferential trade agreements with India (2004) and the South African
Customs Union—SACU (2009). In all these agreements, liberalization applies only to goods,
not including services or investments, which are core issues under the global value chains
framework.
Regarding the negotiation of foreign investment protection agreements, Brazil remained
dormant during a long period. Although in the early 1990s Brazil had signed 14 FIPAs that
contained investor‐state clauses, this model was considered inconsistent with the Brazilian
constitution and the agreements never entered into force. The increase in the number of
Brazilian companies investing abroad in the 2000s prompted the government to revisit the
issue and develop a Brazilian framework for a “cooperation and investment facilitation
agreement.” Brazil has successfully concluded agreements with Angola, Mozambique,
Malawi, Mexico Colombia and Peru. This model has a state‐state dispute settlement mecha‐
nism, and leaves more space for developing domestic regulations that could be challenged in
the traditional FIPAs [21].
In light of the small level of success in the market access negotiations during the 2003–2015
years, the WTO dispute settlement system increased in importance for Brazil’s trade strategy.
Brazil has been one of the most active participants of the WTO dispute settlement system. Since
the establishment of the Dispute Settlement Body in 1995, Brazil has participated in 29 panels
as complainant, 16 disputes as respondent and in 102 cases as interested third party [22]. Brazil
has won some emblematic “victories” for the domestic exporting sector, such as the dispute
with the United States regarding subsidies for cotton production (DS 267), the dispute
regarding sugar exports subsidies granted by the European Union (DS 266) and the dispute
on the rate of equalization on the USA’s imports of orange juice (DS 382).
Taking into account the third aspect of a GVC‐oriented trade policy, the Brazilian government
has not directly recognized the “heterodox” barriers to trade, such as infrastructure, support
services and business environment. Although the government has implemented a large
“Growth Acceleration Plan” geared towards transport infrastructure projects, the plan was not
focused on exporters’ demands. Efforts to reduce red tape and improve Brazil’s business
environment have not materialized, and the so‐called “Brazilian cost” remains as a nontradi‐
tional barrier to trade as well as to the attraction of foreign direct investment.
Trade promotion policies—the last element analyzed in the GVC‐oriented trade policy model
—have been aimed at strengthening the relationship with other developing countries. Between
2003 and 2015, trade promotion efforts resulted in an increase in trade with Africa, Middle East
and Asian countries. In this period, China emerged as Brazil’s main trade partner, surpassing
the United States and absorbing 18.63% of Brazilian global exports in 2015. In contrast,
traditional partners like the European Union and the United States have lost importance as a
destination for Brazilian exports. In 2003, for instance, 22.8% of Brazilian exports went to the
USA and 25.7% to the EU, while, in 2015, this share had decreased to 12.6 and 17.7%, respec‐
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tively. Exports to MERCOUR remained relatively stable. In 2003, Brazilian exports to the bloc
accounted for 7.7% of total exports, while, in 2015, MERCOSUR imported 9.4% of Brazil’s total
exports.
Brazil has focused in policies for fostering small and medium enterprises’ exports. Brazil’s
Export Promotion Agency (APEX), however, has given greater attention to traditional trade
promotion and intelligence tools. Market reports have not focused on production chains,
and they have not developed guides or special mechanisms for linking SME with GVC’s
leader companies. Similarly, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has not oriented the commercial
sections in embassies abroad to proactively seek supply opportunities with leader
companies.
5. Conclusion: towards a repositioning in global value chains?
This chapter has argued that in the last 13 years Brazil has not adopted a proactive stance
towards a greater engagement into GVCs. Taking into account that greater integration requires
trade openness, improved market access, GVC‐oriented trade promotion, and an expanded
vision of international trade that integrates goods, services, investments and intellectual
property, Brazil seems to only superficially commit to globalization. Brazil’s shallow integra‐
tion is in part a result of trade policies aimed at protecting the domestic market and establishing
a market reserve for Brazilian companies in MERCOSUR.
Recent research has demonstrated the positive economic outcomes of engaging in global value
chains. A GVC‐oriented trade policy can positively influence integration of domestic enter‐
prises into GVCs, as well as attracting high value‐added activities. In order to achieve the
objectives of improving Brazil’s competitiveness and promoting a better insertion in the
international economy, it would be recommend a reassessment of the policies aimed at
protecting the domestic and regional market. In a world where industrial production is
fragmented and geographically dispersed, Brazil continues to pursue a vision that it is still
possible and desirable to internalize most of the tasks involved in the multiple steps of adding
value to a product. It seeks to sell internationally a product totally “made in Brazil,” even at
the expense of protecting inefficient industries.
Brazil’s new government of President Michel Temer (PMDB), which took power after the
impeachment of the former President Dilma Rousseff in 2016, has given signs that it will shift
the country foreign trade strategy towards greater integration. A revamped trade policy will
be constrained, however, by external, domestic and MERCOSUR challenges.
In terms of external constraints, it would be important to highlight the following factors: (i)
the delay in recovery of the international economy, (ii) the declining support for multilateral
and regional free trade negotiations, (iii) the loss of an important window of opportunity for
economic integration agreements (such as the failed FTAA negotiations and delays in nego‐
tiations between MERCOSUR and the EU), and (iv) the fact that Brazil is outside the major
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regional trade liberalization initiatives, such as the Trans‐Pacific Partnership (TPP) and other
new‐generation agreements.
Moreover, economic and commercial globalization in all its complexity acts as a systemic
constraint for Brazil’s insertion. Although Brazil seeks a new level of participation in interna‐
tional trade, it is reluctant to abandon practices and perceptions that only made sense in a
context of international production of the last century. One of the main obstacles to a complete
transition to a modern trade policy would be to adopt a more positive stance towards imports
of raw materials, intermediate products and components, taking into account their key role in
the production of goods for both domestic consumption and for reexporting.
Domestically, the most significant challenges are related to overcoming the historic protec‐
tionist orientation and pressures from organized industrial associations. Second, the misper‐
ception of the government in the sense that agribusiness and commodities are the main
offensive interests in Brazil’s trade liberalization negotiations, leaving the domestic industry
linked to defensive interests of protection against a possible increase in foreign competition in
the domestic market. Finally, additional challenges towards a greater participation in global
value chains are linked to issues such as trade facilitation, reduction of red tape and logistics
problems caused by deficiencies in trade infrastructure.
Among the challenges arising from Brazil’s participation in MERCOSUR, the continuity of the
4+1 negotiating model (i.e., member countries cannot negotiate individually preferential trade
agreements) for liberalization agreements with other regions seems to be the most relevant, as
this mechanism becomes even more complex with the expansion of the number of MERCOSUR
members. Moreover, other challenges include the deepening of the political and economic
crisis in Venezuela, and how MERCOSUR will solve the problem of fully integrating the
country into the bloc or reverting its accession process that was controversially approved in
2010.
In sum, Brazil has not adopted a GVC‐oriented trade policy. This does not mean, however,
that it has become an isolated country. Nevertheless, the mainstream mind frame during
Lula da Silva’s government and Dilma Rouseff’s term favored the construction of Brazil’s
own model for economic development and international insertion, which had a limited level
of success. Revamping Brazil’s international trade policy will be key for recovering Brazil’s
economic development path.
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